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NOTES
Surveying the Law of Fee Awards Under the
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
Federal courts have traditionally refrained from awarding attor-
ney's fees to prevailing litigants absent a specific statutory authoriza-
tion or a case falling into one of three well recognized exceptions.' In
1975, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this so called "American Rule' 2
in Ayeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society. 3 Specifically, the Al eska
Court reversed a trend in lower federal courts to create a fourth ex-
ception to the "American Rule," namely, the "private attorney gen-
eral" exception.4 Under this exception, courts reasoned that
plaintiffs who had successfully prosecuted civil rights violations had
advanced a public interest by vindicating congressional policy, and
had thereby earned an award of attorney's fees. In A1eska, the
Supreme Court. rejected this judicially created exception to the
"American Rule" as invading the legislature's province.5
1 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975). The first of these three exceptions to the American Rule is
the "bad faith" exception wherein courts award attorney's fees to a party whose opponent has
proceeded in bad faith, vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527 (1962); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923); Bell v.
School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). The second exception, usually labelled the "com-
mon fund doctrine," allows the payment of attorney's fees out of a common fund created by
the litigation for the benefit of others. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). The third exception permits the
plaintiff to recover attorney's fees from a recalcitrant defendant who disobeys a court order in
a civil contempt proceeding. In such a case, the amount is viewed as a penalty on the defend-
ant for disobeying a court order. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714 (1967); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923).
2 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The rationale behind the "Ameri-
can Rule" is that parties should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a law-
suit. Routinely awarding attorney's fees in litigation would unjustly discourage the poor from
instituting actions to vindicate their rights, if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
opponent's counsel. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967).
3 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
4 See, e.g., Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Fowler v.
Schawrzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (Ist Cir. 1974);
Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1974); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1974). In Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, the court explained that the private attor-
ney general exception encouraged plaintiffs to pursue civil rights litigation despite the great
expense and well-financed defendants involved, thereby enforcing such legislation. Id at
1032.
5 421 U.S. at 271.
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Academic commentators almost unanimously condemned the
Alyeska decision, warning that it effectively stifled the private en-
forcement of civil rights.6 In response to Alyeska, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 7 This act
amended section 1988 to allow district courts, in their discretion, to
award reasonable attorney's fees to parties, other than the United
States, who prevail in suits brought to enforce their civil rights under
certain civil rights statutes.8 According to the legislative history,
Congress intended the Act to "remedy anomalous gaps in our civil
rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in Ayeska . . . and to achieve consistency in our civil rights
laws."9 The Senate Judiciary Committee, which reported favorably
on the bill, recognized that the congressional policies contained in
civil rights laws depend heavily on enforcement by private citizens.' 0
The committee noted that since many private citizens are without
sufficient funds to finance a lawsuit, especially where merely prospec-
tive relief is sought, to preclude the award of fees effectively frustrates
6 See, e.g., Special Project, Recent Developments in Attorney's Fees, 29 VAND. L. REV. 685,
719 (1976); Comment, Alyeska Pipeline Turns Offthe Tap.- Can Public Interest Law Survive, 72 Nw.
U.L. RE v. 239, 247 (1976); Comment, After A.yeska: Will Public Interest Litigation Survive?, 16
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 288 (1976).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). For a description of the Act's progress through Congress, see
Malson, In Response to Alyeska-The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. LOUIS
U.L.J. 430 (1977).
8 Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985
and 1986 of this title. . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) ("section 1988" or the "Act"). The sections to which § 1988 applies
(§§ 1981-1986) are commonly referred to as the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Acts. Sec-
tion 1981 requires equality in civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1981). Section 1982
guarantees all persons within the United States jurisdiction equality in property rights. Id.
§ 1982. Section 1983, the section plaintiffs most frequently rely upon, prohibits anyone from
depriving any United States citizen or person within the United States jurisdiction of any
right, privilege, or immunity granted by the Constitution under color of state law. Id § 1983.
Section 1985 prohibits conspiracies to interfere with another's civil rights. Id. § 1985. Section
1986 provides a penalty for those who are aware of conspiracies that violate § 1985 but fail to
act to prevent the interference although they have the power to do so. Id. § 1986.
9 S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908-09. The gaps and inconsistencies to which the Senate Report refers arise because
other civil rights legislation has expressly provided for the award of attorney's fees. See, e.g.,
Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (repealed in 1978); Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1975, § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 2973(e) (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976); Id § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Fair Housing
Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).




the purpose of civil rights laws." The committee appropriately
quoted Judge Clark from Hall v. Cole:'2 "Not to award counsel fees
in cases such as this would be tantamount to repealing the Act itself
by frustrating its basic purpose."' 3 In sum, the Act's goal is to en-
courage private enforcement of civil rights legislation by citizens who
could not otherwise afford it.
Statistics indicate that the goal of opening the federal judiciary's
doors to all civil rights plaintiffs has been fulfilled. Within five years
of its enactment, the number of civil rights cases brought against
state and local governments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 increased by
two-thirds.14 Accompanying this increase was a concurrent rise in
the number of cases involving proper application of the Act. This
note surveys, through court decisions, the current state of the law
relating to the Act and analyzes the decisions in light of the Act's
legislative history and purpose. Parts I and II of this note discuss,
respectively, who may recover, and who may be liable for, attorney's
fees under the Act. Part III discusses whether attorney's fees are
available when the litigation terminates without court ordered relief,
and part IV discusses the calculation of a reasonable fee.
I. Who May Recover Under the Act
Section 1988 provides that a "prevailing party" 15 may recover
attorney's fees from his opponent. Despite the straightforward lan-
guage, this term has prompted much litigation. This section of the
note discusses the standards applied by courts in determining
whether a party has "prevailed" within the meaning of the Act.
A. The Prevailing Plaintzj7
Congress patterned the section 1988 language after that in Titles
1116 and VII 17 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act's legislative
history indicates that Congress intended the standards for awarding
11 Id. at 3, reprzted'in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5910-11.
12 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972).
13 S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 2, reprinted i'n 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5910 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 462 F.2d at 780-81.)
14 Diamond, The Firestorm Over Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A.B.A. J. 1420 (1983). According
to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the number of lawsuits filed against state and
local governments rose from 17,543 in 1976 to 29,173 in 1981. Id. at 1420.
15 See note 8 supra.
16 Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976), prohibits discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation. Section 2000a-3(b) covers attorney's fees:
1. In any action pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
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fees under the Act, including the meaning of "prevailing," to be gen-
erally the same as that under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 In fact,
the Senate Report on the Act cited with approval1 9 the Supreme
Court's interpretation, in Newman v. Pggie Park Enterprises, Inc. ,20 of
the term "prevailing" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Newman,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that the plain-
tiffs, who had won injunctive relief under Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, were not entitled to a fee award unless they could show
that the defendants had proceeded in bad faith or for the purpose of
delay.21 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that a "successful"
plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render it unjust. ' 22
Although this interpretation of "prevailing" supports the policy
of encouraging private litigation, the term "successful" is no less am-
biguous than "prevailing." One court has subsequently defined
"successful" to mean "succeed[ing] on any significant issue in litiga-
part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private
person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976).
i7 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), prohibits discrimi-
natory employment practices. Section 2000e-5(k) covers attorney's fees:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Com-
mission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the
Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private
person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
The most notable distinction regarding attorney's fees between Titles II and VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 1988 is that in Titles II and VII Congress included express
language imposing liability on the United States equal to that of a private person. Courts
later found the omission of such language in § 1988 critical and exempted the United States
from liability under the Act. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban
Dev., 577 F.2d 854, 860 (3d Cir. 1978). However, by adopting the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1981), in October, 1981, Congress expressly waived the fed-
eral government's immunity from assessments of attorney's fees where other parties would be
similarly liable. See text accompanying notes 66-75 infra.
18 S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5911.
19 Id. at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5913.
20 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
21 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967).
22 390 U.S. at 402. In Newman, the Court noted that if plaintiffs were required to bear
their own attorney's fees, "few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public
interest." Id. Five years later, in Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per
curiam), the Supreme Court applied the same reasoning and standard to a fee shifting provi-
sion under the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1976) (repealed
in 1978). Section 1617 of that act contained a similar fees award clause. The Supreme Court
standard has been commonly referred to as the Newman-Northcross standard.
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tion which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought. ' 23 Other
courts have emphasized that the successful plaintiff-applicant need
not show the defendant proceeded in bad faith or frivolously,2 4 that
the nature of his conduct was intentional or wanton, 25 or that the
plaintiff is himself unable to pay the fees. 26 Were these determina-
tions relevant, a plaintiff might prevail on the merits but still have to
pay his attorney's fees. Faced with this possibility, many plaintiffs,
even those with meritorious claims, might forego litigation.27 Like-
wise, an attorney might be hesitant to take civil rights cases if unable
to assess his chances of a fee award. Therefore, by eliminating these
conditions for awarding section 1988 attorney's fees to prevailing
parties, courts have further encouraged private enforcement of civil
rights laws.
In contrast to the liberal interpretation of section 1988 reflected
above, some courts have denied prevailing parties fee awards where
23 Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978). In Nadeau, the plaintiffs, inmates
at the New Hampshire State Prison, filed a § 1983 suit seeking access to library facilities and
improved confinement conditions. Prior to completing the trial, the parties entered into, and
the district court subsequently approved, a consent decree which considerably improved the
conditions the plaintiff class had been subjected to prior to the institution of the suit. Id at
277. The district court, however, refused to award attorney's fees because the plaintiffs had
not succeeded in obtaining formal relief. The First Circuit remanded the case stating that
"plaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed
on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing the suit." Id. at 278-79.
24 See, e.g., Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1967); Olitskey v. O'Malley, 597 F.2d 303, 305 (1st
Cir. 1979); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 489 (3d Cir. 1978).
25 See, e.g., Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1977); Gates v. Collier, 559
F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1972); Rowe v.
General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1972); Miller v. Amusement Enters.,
426 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1970).
26 See, e.g., Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1500 (10th Cir. 1983); Sargeant v. Sharp,
579 F.2d 645, 649 (Ist Cir. 1982); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 492 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Gunther v. Iowa
State Men's Reformatory, 466 F. Supp. 367, 369 (N.D. Iowa 1969); c. Zarcone v. Perry, 581
F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978). The Zarcone court is credited with establishing the "bright pros-
pects" rule: a plaintiff whose case possesses the potential for a large damage award and who
can therefore secure private counsel through a contingency arrangement, cannot utilize the
Act because he does not need it to attract competent counsel. Id at 1044. However, other
courts have questioned the Zarcone opinion because it ignores the deterrent effect fee awards
can have on defendants. See, e.g., Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1503 (10th Cir. 1983);
Sanchez v. Schwartz, 688 F.2d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
27 Of course, every plaintiff assumes the risk of not prevailing on the merits. This is a risk
that an experienced lawyer should be able to reasonably quantify for the potential litigant
before proceeding to trial. However, unlike the risk of losing the substantive claim, counsel
cannot reliably predict the chance of recovering fees because of such additional factors as the
plaintiff's good faith at trial.
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"special circumstances" exist. They have asserted two bases for this
authority: 1) the judicial discretion granted in assessing fees by the
Act 28 and 2) the Supreme Court's Newman opinion requiring that a
prevailing party receive attorney's fees unless special circumstances
would render it unjust.29 For instance, courts have denied prevailing
plaintiffs attorney's fees where the complaint was in reality a tort
action cloaked in a constitutional due process claim,30 where the pub-
lic was not benefitted by the litigation,31 where only nominal dam-
ages were awarded, 32 and in other situations. 33
28 See note 8 supra. ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee.") (emphasis added).
29 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
30 Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.C. Minn. 1983) (case was no more than
a common law negligence dog-bite case clothed as a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Zarcone v. Perry, 438 F. Supp. 788, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (tort action for false impris-
onment and false arrest couched in a constitutional due process claim). Justice Rehnquist
warned in dissent in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 522 (1978) that "[t]here are a large
number of claims that can be converted by a legal neophyte into a claim of denial of proce-
dural due process." Cf Milne v. Cavuato, 653 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1981) (award of attorney's
fees proper where plaintiff prevailed on wholly statutory, non-civil rights claim pendent to a
substantial state claim); Konczak v. Tyrell, 603 F.2d 13, 19 (7th Cir. 1979), (award of attor-
ney's fees proper even if only a private wrong is righted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980);
Kow v. New York City Housing Auth., 539 F. Supp. 708, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting
defendant's contention that fee award was inappropriate since case provided only a private
benefit, but allowed only one-half of the award requested).
31 See, e.g., Perez v. University of P.R., 600 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979); Buxton v. Patel, 595
F.2d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1979); Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
Zarcone v. Perry, 438 F. Supp. 788, 791 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). For instance, in Zarcone, the plain-
tiff, a coffee vendor, was handcuffed and brought into night traffic court so that the presiding
judge could criticize the quality of the coffee he sold. Zarcone subsequently succeeded in
recovering compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $140,000. Id at 789. The district
court, however, refused to award attorney's fees under § 1988 because the suit was basically
one for damages for false imprisonment and benefitted the public only in a general sense. Id
at 790. Rather than precluding an award, other courts view the lack of public benefit as
reason for reducing the amount of the award. See, e.g., Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 576
F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1978); Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977),
rev'don other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Foster v. Gloucester County Bd., 465 F. Supp. 923
(D.N.J. 1978); Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
It seems anomalous for courts to provide § 1983 relief to a plaintiff whose individual civil
rights are violated but to award fees only where the litigation impacts favorably on the public
in the district court's view. All successful civil rights suits benefit the public in that the partic-
ular defendant and others will be deterred from such conduct in the future.
32 Huntley v. Community School Bd., 579 F.2d 738, 742 (1978) ($100 nominal damages
award deemed a "moral victory" insufficient to warrant an award of attorney's fees). Other
courts view the award of nominal damages as relevant in determining the amount of the fee's
award, but not its availability. See Skoda v. Fontani, 646 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981); Perez v.
University of P.R., 600 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979); Rhueark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897 (N.D.
Tex. 1979).
33 See Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff's chance of success
sufficiently high to attract competent counsel); Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (1978); Pharr
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Some commentators have forcefully argued that granting courts
the discretion to deny fee awards in undefined, "special circum-
stances" has ultimately frustrated the Act's purpose.3 4 The lack of
objective criteria upon which an attorney can assess his chance of an
award under the Act eventually discourages private enforcement.
Therefore, courts should use their discretion only to determine the
amount of the fee award and not its availability.
B. The Prevailing Defendant
The Act's legislative history indicates that prevailing defendants
may also recover attorney's fees. 35 However, in contrast to the liberal
Newman-Northcross standard applicable to prevailing plaintiffs, 36 the
Supreme Court stated in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,37 that de-
fendants may only recover a fee award where the "action was frivo-
lous, unreasonable or without foundation. '38 The court noted that
this high standard appropriately favors prevailing plaintiffs over pre-
vailing defendants for two reasons: 1) the plaintiff is the "chosen in-
strument ' 39 to advance congressional policy; and 2) when a plaintiff
v. Housing Auth., 704 F.2d 1216 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (fee award limited by terms of contingent
fee arrangement in a § 1983 action); White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec.,
455 U.S. 445, 454 (1982) (court might deny fee awards where the post-judgment motion un-
fairly surprises or prejudices the defendant); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 576 F.2d 714,
718 (6th Cir. 1978) (the attorney's fee award would have been paid by the school treasury-
the same funds used to educate the beneficiaries of the desegregation order).
34 Berger, Court Awarded Attomr's Fees: What is 'Reasonable'"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281,
283-94 (1977); see also Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorng's Fees
Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 377 (1980); Comment, Calculation ofa Reasonable Awardof
Attorney's Fees Under the Attorner's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 331, 398-99
(1980).
35 See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); S. REP. No. 10 11, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5912.
36 See note 22 supra and text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
37 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
38 ld. at 421. The court also noted that when a plaintiff acts in bad faith, the court needs
no statutory authority to award attorney's fees given the common-law exception recognized
in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975). See note 1 supra; cf text
accompanying note 44 infra; Harris v. Group Health Ass'n Inc., 662 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1979); EEOC v. First Ala. Bank, 595
F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1979); Richardson v. Hotel Corp., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1971); Moss v.
ITr Continental Banking Co., 468 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Va. 1979); Reed v. Sisters of Charity,
447 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. La. 1978); Goff v. Texas Instruments Inc., 429 F. Supp. 973 (N.D.
Tex. 1977). While courts generally will not look at the defendant's ability to pay when the
plaintiff prevails, they will do so where the prevailing defendant seeks attorney's fees from the
plaintiff under the Christianburg standard. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); Lee v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 389 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1975); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 297 F. Supp.
852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
39 Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 418-19.
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prevails, the fee award is against a defendant who has violated fed-
eral laws, but when a defendant prevails, this is not true.40 A more
persuasive reason for this double standard, as recognized in the Sen-
ate Judiciary Report,4 1 is that if made responsible for their oppo-
nent's attorney's fees when unsuccessful, plaintiffs might be deterred
from prosecuting valid claims, thereby frustrating the Act's
purpose.42
As previously mentioned, an established exception to the
"American rule" which forbids federal courts from awarding attor-
ney's fees is where one party has proceeded in bad faith or vexa-
tiously.43 A court, therefore, could arguably award attorney's fees to
a defendant against a vexatious plaintiff without a specific statutory
authorization. However, there is apparently a fine distinction be-
tween this common law exception and the Christianburg "bad faith"
exception. In Gofv. Texas Instruments Co. , the federal district court
concluded that since section 1988 includes a separate standard for
defendants, it requires a more liberal application than the traditional
common law bad faith test.45 While the court's interpretation is rea-
sonable, the judges must proceed with caution in applying section
1988 to prevailing defendants since they risk deterring potential
plaintiffs and their counsel.
C. Attorneys Who May Recover
Section 1988 indicates that the plaintiff, and not his attorney, is
technically entitled to the fee award.46 While the client may be the
real party in interest, 47 the practical benefit inures entirely to the at-
40 Id. at 419.
41 [P]rivate attorneys general should not be deterred from bringing good faith ac-
tions to vindicate the fundamental rights here involved by the prospect of having to
pay their opponent's counsel fees should they lose. Such a party, if unsuccessful,
could be assessed his opponent's fee only where it is shown that his suit was clearly
frivolous, vexatious or brought for harassment purposes.
S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5912.
42 Accord Heinsz, Attorny's Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants. Toward a Workable Stan-
dard, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 259 (1977); Note, Attorne's Fees-Recover by Prevailing Defendants in
Title VII Actions, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (1977).
43 See note 1 supra.
44 429 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
45 Id. at 975.
46 See note 8 supra.
47 See Richards v. Reed, 611 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1980) ("It was proper for client to be
made real party in interest in proceeding to recover attorney's fees,. . . since recovery would
go to client in the first instance, though lawyer would ultimately benefit."); see also Proctor v.
Gissendaner, 579 F.2d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 1975).
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torney. Therefore, which attorneys are eligible becomes an appropri-
ate consideration.
The Act undoubtedly applies where a party is represented by a
private attorney.48 However, courts have also found organizational
attorneys and members of legal aid societies entitled to a fee
equivalent to that which would have been awarded to a party repre-
sented by a private attorney. 49 Recently, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed this position in Blum v. Stenson. 50 In this case, the Court
concluded that Congress intended fee awards to be based on "pre-
vailing market rates in the relevant community, . . . regardless of
whether the prevailing party is represented by private profit-making
attorneys or nonprofit legal aid organizations."'51 Whether the client
is obliged to pay less than the normal fee, or no fee at all is therefore
irrelevant to whether, and to what extent, a court awards attorney's
fees.52 Of course, courts premise such holdings on the assumption
that any award will be turned over to the organization, and not re-
tained by the client or the responsible attorney. 53
The Act's legislative history provides no authority for treating a
legal aid attorney differently than a private attorney. According to
the Senate Judiciary Committee report, "[f]ees under the Act are to
be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of
equally complex federal litigation, such as antitrust cases."'54 There-
48 In this context, "private attorney" means an attorney procured by a private individual
to handle his lawsuit for a fee-not a salaried attorney who works for an institution.
49 See Palmigiano v. Garrahay, 616 F.2d 598 (ist Cir. 1980); Lund v. Aflleck, 587 F. 2d
75 (1st Cir. 1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d
598 (5th Cir. 1974); Becker v. Blum, 487 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); cf. Page v. Priesser,
468 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Iowa 1979)(award of attorney's fees to Legal Services Corporation of
Iowa should be based, in part, on attorney's salary and other ascertainable overhead ex-
penses); and from the same court, Alsager v. District Court, 447 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Iowa
1977) (fees paid to plaintiff's American Civil Liberties Union based on attorney's annual sal-
ary and time expended on case). See generally Note, Awards of Attorn~y's Fees to LegalAid Oiftes,
87 HARV. L. REV. 411 (1973).
50 52 U.S.L.W. 4377 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984).
51 Id. at 4379. The defendant in B/um argued that the fee award should be based on the
costs incurred by the legal aid organization. Id. The court rejected this proposition as flatly
contrary to the Act's legislative history. Id.
52 Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436. U.S. 913 (1978);
Hairston v. R. & R. Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1975); Incarcerated Men v. Fair, 507
F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974).
53 See Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 n.10 (8th Cir. 1980)(awarding fees to Legal
Aid Society of Omaha-Council Bluffs, Inc., which will go not to the individual attorneys, but
to their organization employer); Hairston v. R. & R. Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1093 (1975);
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Amusement En-
ters., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970).
54 S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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fore, under section 1988, courts should award organizational attor-
ney's fees equal to that charged by private firms within the
community. Theoretically, fee awards permit such public organiza-
tions, often understaffed and underfunded, to finance additional liti-
gation in the civil rights area.
Opponents of fee awards to organizational attorneys argue that
the awards are not necessary to attract competent counsel in civil
rights cases because these attorneys are paid by their employer to
handle the case. Opponents also argue that the fee awards come out
of the public sector, which in part funds the organization's opera-
tions. 55 However, these arguments ignore the Act's main goal: pro-
moting private civil rights enforcement. Awarding fees to a
prevailing public organization will permit it to hire additional attor-
neys, service more clients, and generally further the Act's goal. 56
Finally, courts have also awarded fees to court appointed attor-
neys57 and attorneys working pro bono. 58 Once again, these awards
promote private enforcement of civil rights laws by encouraging
other attorneys to accept such cases in the future.
II. Who May be Liable
Ordinarily, an individual defendant becomes liable for attor-
ney's fees if unsuccessful in defending against the substantive claim.
However, the question of who can be liable for a fee award is compli-
cated when the defendants, often government entities or their officers
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claim immunity from such an award.
NEws at 5913. Despite this congressional intent, members of public interest law firms fre-
quently complain that fee awards under the civil rights laws are unreasonably low as com-
pared to awards in private antitrust actions under the Clayton Act. Berger, supra note 34, at
292-93. See generally COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUS-
TICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 321 (1976).
55 See Blum v. Stenson, 52 U.S.L.W. 4377, 4379 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984); Dennis v. Chang,
611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980); Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1980);
Palmigiano v. Garrahay, 616 F.2d 598, 600 (1st Cir. 1980); Hairston v. R. & R. Apartments,
510 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1975); Brandenberger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir.
1974); cf. New York State Ass'n v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983) (court adopted a new
"break-point" approach to setting § 1988 fee awards for non-profit firms, finding $75 per
hour to be the point at which the organization is adequately compensated without receiving a
windfall).
56 The opponent's argument also erroneously implies that the fee award will go to the
individual attorney when in actuality, it goes to his employer. See cases cited in note 53 supra.
57 See Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 756 (5th Cir. 1977); Drew v. Brierton, 443 F. Supp.
389 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
58 McMurray v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 770 (W.D. La. 1982); Letelier v. Republic of




This section of the note discusses the Act's applicability where the
defendants are the United States, state or local governments, or their
administrative or judicial officers.
A. The United States
Prior to October, 1981, prevailing parties could not recover at-
torney's fees under section 1988 from the United States.59 The courts
so holding relied on 28 U.S.C. section 2412,60 wherein Congress pro-
hibited attorney's fees awards against the United States absent an
express statutory waiver of immunity. For example, in Shannon v.
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development,61 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit noted both the prohibition in section
2412 and the lack of an express provision in section 1988 for fee
awards against the United States.62 The court noted that other fed-
eral civil rights statutes, such as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, contain a fee provision. 63
Since one purpose of section 1988 was to achieve consistency in
the civil rights laws,64 why Congress allowed courts to award fees
against the United States under Title II but not under section 1988 is
unclear. At least one court has suggested that it was mere
oversight.65
Whatever the reason, on October 1, 1981, Congress promul-
gated the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA").66 The EAJA
59 See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 643
F.2d 1034, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981); NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Polos v. United States, 621 F.2d 385, 394 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Shannon v. United States Dep't of
Housing & Urban Dev., 577 F.2d 854, 855-56 (3d Cir. 1978).
60 Prior to amendment in October, 1981, § 2412 provided:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enu-
merated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of attor-
neys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or agency or official of the United States acting in his
official capacity, in any court having jurisdiction of such action.
28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976).
61 577 F.2d 854, 855-56 (3d Cir. 1978).
62 Id at 855-56; see, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(e) (1982)
("The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees."); see also note 17
.spra.
63 577 F.2d at 855-56. "The United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private
person." Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976).
64 S. REP. No. 94-1011,supra note 9, at l,reprinedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws
at 5909; see text accompanying note 9 supra.
65 Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 433 F. Supp. 249, 251
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
66 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1981).
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amended 28 U.S.C. section 2412 to permit courts to charge the
United States with "[attorney's] fees and expenses to the same extent
that any other party would be liable .. .under the terms of any
statutes which specifically provides for such award." 67 The House
Judiciary Committee, which reported favorably on the amendment,
recognized that certain individuals were deterred from seeking re-
view of, or defending against, unreasonable government intrusion be-
cause of the disparity in resources available to the parties. 68 The
Committee further noted that this disparity was also a significant
factor because of the proliferation of the federal bureacracy and gov-
ernmental regulation.69
Recently, in Premachandra v. aMits,70 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit became the first court to consider the relationship be-
tween the EAJA and section 1988. In that case, a Veteran's Admin-
istration research scientist sought and received reinstatement to his
job after claiming that his termination violated his fifth amendment
procedural due process rights.71 Although the case was settled out of
court, the district court determined that the plaintiff was a prevailing
party72 and, relying on section 1988 and the EAJA amended section
2412, awarded attorney's fees. On appeal the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed. Referring extensively to the legislative history of the EAJA,
the court of appeals noted Congress' intent to "place the federal gov-
ernment and civil litigants on completely equal footing" 73 and to
"clarif[y] the liability of the United States under such statutes as the
67 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. V 1981). The section provides:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and ex-
penses of attorneys, in addition to the cost which may be awarded pursuant to sub-
section (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the
United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her
professional capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United
States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other
party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute
which specifically provides for such an award.
Id
68 H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 4984.
69 Id. at 8, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4988.
70 Premachandra v. Mitts, No. 82-2441, slip op. (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 1984).
71 Id. at 2.
72 Id. at 5. The court used the Nadeau two prong test to so decide. See text accompanying
notes 100-01 infra.
73 Id. at 19, 20 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 68, at 8, 9, reprintdin 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4987).
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Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976." 74 The court con-
cluded that the EAJA required the imposition of attorney's fees on a
federal agency where, had a state or state official committed the same
acts or omissions, it would be liable under section 1988. 75
By adopting the EAJA, Congress corrected the anomaly which
permitted the federal government to insulate itself from its own civil
rights laws. Congress has now submitted the federal government to
the same penalties levied upon state governments who violate civil
rights laws.
B. State and Local Governments
In Hutto v. Finngy,76 the Supreme Court rejected the position that
the eleventh amendment provides state and local governments im-
munity to section 1988 assessments of attorney's fees.77 The Court
first relied upon legislative history to show that Congress intended
liability for attorney's fees under section 1988 to extend to the states.
The Senate Judiciary Report on section 1988 stated: "[I]t is intended
that the attorney's fees, like other items of costs, will be collected
either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of
his agency or under his control, or from the state and local govern-
ment .... -78 Likewise, the corresponding House Report stated:
"The greater resources available to governments provide an ample
base from which fees can be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in
suits against governmental officials or entities. '79 The Court also
noted that Congress had rejected two recent attempts to amend sec-
tion 1988 to provide for state governmental immunity.80
Although the eleventh amendment normally bans retroactive
relief against the states, the Court found the fee award in Hutto con-
stitutional. The Court noted that in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 8'it had held
74 Id. at 22 (citing H.R. REP. No. 9 6-1418, supra note 68, at 9, 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4987, 4996).
75 Id. at 19.
76 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
77 The eleventh amendment reads:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
citizens of another state, or by citizens or subject of any foreign state.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
78 S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5913.
79 H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, supra note 35, at 7.
80 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978); see 122 CONG. REC. 31,832-35 (1976) (amendment of Sen.
Helms); id. at 32,296, 32,396-97 (amendment of Sen. Allen).
81 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
that the eleventh amendment's bar to retroactive relief was limited
by the fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause.82 Since section
1988 applies to laws arising under the enforcement clause, the Court
found section 1988 a valid exercise of congressional authority.8 3
C. Government Ofcials
When a court finds a state or local government official liable in
his official capacity, the employing governmental unit is responsible
for any fee award.8 4 However, when the government official is found
liable as a private individual, two policy considerations collide. On
one hand, to encourage private enforcement of civil rights, all de-
fendants should be held to the same standard of conduct, thereby
achieving consistent application of the Act. On the other hand, pub-
lic officials, fearing personal liability for their acts, might not zeal-
ously and properly discharge their duties. In Hutto, the Supreme
Court resolved this conflict in favor of the latter consideration and
held that section 1988 does not apply where the governmental official
is liable as a private individual. 85 In such cases, the prevailing plain-
tiff may recover fees from the individual official only by showing the
official's bad faith.86
D. Judicial Oficers
Judges who violate section 1983 present a particularly trouble-
some problem of immunity. The problem arises more frequently
than one might think; in the last three years over two hundred law-
suits have alleged section 1983 violations against judges.87 Until ab-
rogated by statute, judges and prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity
from liability for money damages. 88 The House Judiciary Commit-
82 427 U.S. at 453. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part:
Section 1 . . . No state shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5.. . The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
83 427 U.S. at 455-56. See generally Note, Attorny's Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1875 (1975).
84 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
85 437 U.S. at 699 n.32.
86 Id
87 Diamond, supra note 14.
88 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In
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tee, in its report on section 1988, said that because of this judicial
immunity from money damages, "awarding counsel fees to prevail-
ing plaintiffs. . . [as costs] is particularly important and necessary if
federal civil and constitutional rights are to be adequately
protected."8 9
The federal courts of appeals appear divided on whether judi-
cial immunity extends to declaratory and prospective relief, as dis-
tinct from retroactive money damages. 9° However, in Allen v. Burke,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a circuit where judicial
immunity does not bar injunctive relief against judges, 9i held that a
court may charge attorney's fees to state court judges under section
1988 where injunctive relief is properly granted.92 In so holding, the
Fourth Circuit relied upon Supreme Court v. Consumer's Union.93 In Con-
sumer' Union, the Supreme Court sustained a district court's levy of
attorney's fees under section 1988 against the justices of the Virginia
Supreme Court in their "enforcement capacity. ' 94 The Court distin-
guished between the justices' "enforcement capacity" in regulating
the Virginia bar and their "judicial capacity" and found that actions
in the former capacity were not entitled to judicial immunity.95 In
summary, while the extent to which judicial immunity bars prospec-
tive relief remains an open question, those circuits which allow in-
junctive relief against judicial officers may also permit the concurrent
Pierson, the Court implied that Congress has the power to abolish judicial immunity: "[We
presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the [judi-
cial immunity] doctrine." 386 U.S. at 554-55.
89 H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, supra note 35, at 7.
90 The Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits do not extend judicial immunity to bar
prospective relief. Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1979); Fowler v.
Alexander, 478 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 1973); Hansen v. Algrim, 520 F.2d 768, 769 (7th Cir.
1975). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits appear to agree. Kelsey v. Fitzgerald, 574 F.2d 443,
444 (8th Cir. 1978) (only damage portion of suit against judge properly dismissed because of
judicial immunity); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1978) ("quasi-judicial" immu-
nity enjoyed by the clerk of the state court did not extend to suits for injunctive relief).
91 See note 90 supra.
92 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 29 (1983).
93 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
94 Id. at 736. In Virginia, the Supreme Court has sole authority to regulate and disci-
pline its attorneys. Pursuant to this authority, the Virginia Supreme Court promulgated and
enforced the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, wherein Rule 2-102(A)(6) strictly
prohibited lawyer advertising and inclusion in legal directories except under well-defined cir-
cumstances. In Consumer's Union, the plaintiff sought to publish a legal directory and filed suit
contending that the Code's prohibitions violated the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at
726. The district court, relying on Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), declared Rule 2-
102(A)(6) unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the Virginia Supreme Court from en-
forcing it. Id. at 721-27.
95 Id. at 736.
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award of attorney's fees as costs. 96
III. Formal Relief Unnecessary
Section 1988 permits district courts to award attorney's fees to
the prevailing party in any "action or proceeding" 97 to enforce the
civil rights laws enumerated in the statute. Whether the Act applies
in those situations where the parties settle the litigation before judg-
ment is unclear, given this language.
When the parties settle the case by consent decree, the policies
behind the Act suggest that a fee award is proper. Not only has the
plaintiff secured compliance with congressional directives, but judi-
cial economy has also been served by lessening the court's docket. In
Maher v. Gange,98 the Supreme Court held that the applicant whose
section 1983 suit terminated in a favorable consent decree, was as
entitled to a fee award as an applicant who had obtained formal
relief at trial.9 9 Clearly, the party securing the favorable consent de-
cree is the "prevailing" party.
However, when the parties have settled outside of court, it is
sometimes difficult to determine if the applicant for a fee award is
the "prevailing" party. In Nadeau v. Helgemoe, °00 the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit announced a two prong test for determin-
ing whether a plaintiff who settled out of court was entitled to an
attorney's fee award. The court held that a party was entitled to an
award if- 1) the plaintiff's action was a necessary and important fac-
tor in achieving the defendant's concessions; and 2) the relief sought
was required by law. 101 In evaluating the second prong of the Nadeau
test, a court, however, must consider the merits of the case. This
unnecessary adjudication could eventually consume whatever court
time the pretrial settlement saved. Also, requiring the plaintiff to
prove that he would have succeeded at trial discourages settlements.
This concern about discouraging settlements led the District
Court of Maryland in Unemployed Workers Organizing Commission v. Bat-
terton,102 to dispense with the second prong of the Nadeau test. The
96 See Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 507 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 699, 672 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
97 See note 8 supra.
98 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
99 Id. at 130.
100 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
101 Id. at 280-81.
102 477 F. Supp. 509 (D. Md. 1979).
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court said the focus should instead be on whether the plaintiff ob-
tained the relief sought, regardless of whether he would have pre-
vailed at trial.'0 3 The Batterton holding is subject to criticism,
however, for removing any incentive for the defendant to settle.
Under Batterton, a defendant who settles out of court would be auto-
matically liable for attorney's fees but, should the case go to trial, the
defendant's liability for fees would be contingent upon the plaintiff
successfully proving the defendant liable on the merits. In order to
solve this problem, courts that anticipate a subsequent petition for
attorney's fees should refuse to approve a settlement that does not
contain fee provisions.
Finally, the most troublesome situation with regard to fee
awards occurs when a defendant's voluntary act renders the case
moot. In these situations, the parties do not execute a settlement
agreement and therefore obviously cannot negotiate a fee agreement.
If the plaintiff subsequently applies for attorney's fees, the court must
assess the impact of the plaintiff's suit on the defendant's conduct.
The critical issue is whether the plaintiff catalyzed the defendant's
corrective actions, or if the defendant did so voluntarily. Although
no court has yet addressed the problem, the Nadeau test utilized in
settlement cases is also applicable where the defendant's remedial ac-
tions render the case moot. If the court finds that the plaintiff's suit
was a substantial impetus for the defendant's corrective action, and
that the relief sought would have been required by a court, then he
should be entitled to a fee award as a prevailing party.
IV. Calculating a Reasonable Fee
Once a party has established that he is entitled to a fee award,
the court must calculate the proper amount. This determination is
crucial to promoting the Act's purpose. The size of these fee awards
will directly affect the private bar's willingness to litigate such suits.
The award must not be a windfall to the attorney, 0 4 yet it must be
competitive with that which the attorney would have earned had he
spent his time in other work. Given the frequency with which fee
awards are litigated and their potential impact upon the bar's will-
ingness to accept civil rights cases, courts should employ a systematic
and consistent approach to calculating fees. The courts currently do
not use a consistent approach: a study of civil rights cases from 1974-
103 Id. at 512-13.
104 S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5913.
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1979 indicated that compensation rates varied by as much as 685
percent. 105
One reason for this wide variance is the minimal guidance on
fee calculation found in the Act's legislative history. 0 6 Another is the
failure of many courts to articulate their fee calculation method-an
undisclosed method obviously cannot be followed by other courts. 10 7
One exception to this, however, is the oft-cited case ofJohnson v. Geor-
gia Hhwqy Express, Inc. ,108 where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit announced twelve criteria for trial courts to consider in deter-
mining a proper fee award. Injrohnson, the trial court had awarded
attorney's fees without explaining how they arrived at the particular
amount. 0 9 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that effective appel-
late review is impossible unless district courts record their reasons for
arriving at a certain amount.1 10 In remanding the case, the Fifth
Circuit instructed the district court to consider the following twelve
criteria in calculating the fee amount:
1) the time and labor expended by counsel;
2) the novelty and difficulty of the case;
3) the particular attorney's skill;
4) any preclusive effect this case might have had on counsel's
ability to take other cases;
5) the attorney's customary fee;
6) the contingent nature of the litigation;
7) any unusual time limitations imposed by the litigant;
8) the amount of money involved in the case, or relief sought;
9) the experience, ability and reputation of counsel;
10) any undesirability in being associated with the cause;
11) the length of relationship between attorney and client;
12) awards in similar cases."'
105 Comment, supra note 34, at 378.
106 The legislative history merely referred to Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussed in text accompanying notes 108-11 infra), and cited
cases where courts properly applied thejohnson criteria. See S. REP. No. 94-1011,supra note 9,
at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5913.
107 One commentator surveyed the district court opinions in volumes 384-94 of the Fed-
eral Supplement (1974-75). Of the 28 reported cases involving a fee determination, 13 cases
contained "absolutely no articulated reason for the amount [of attorneys' fees] awarded." See
Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees.- What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977).
108 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). For cases citingJohnson, see note 112 infira.
109 488 F.2d at 715.
110 Id. at 717.
111 Id. at 717-19. The 12 criteria are analogous to those enumerated in the MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1979), for calculating attorney's fees with
one exception: criterion number 10-the undesirability of being associated with the case.
Ethically, the undesirability of a case should not impact upon the lawyer's billing rate, but as
the Fifth Circuit apparently realized, in reality it does. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
[19841
[Vol. 59:1293]
Other courts quickly accepted the Johnson criteria." 2 Indeed, even
the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on section 1988 cited the
Johnson case with approval."t 3
The Johnson criteria, however useful, have not substantially re-
duced the confusion regarding calculation of fee amounts. Commen-
tators have criticized the list because the court did not state which
factors, if any, should be weighed more heavily,' 1 4 because some cri-
teria appear redundant," t5 and because other criteria contradict the
legislative history of section 1988.116 Among the courts that claim
adherance to the factors, many have applied them quite differ-
ently."t 7 Still other courts, the Second Circuit in particular, alto-
gether reject the criteria due to their inherent complexity and
subjectivity." 8 The end result is that private attorneys cannot confi-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1983) (listing eight relevant criteria in determining a reasonable
fee which subsume the Johnson criteria except for criterion number 10-undesirability of the
case).
112 Courts cited theJohnson factors with approval in the following § 1988 cases: Hampton
v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 643 (7th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir.
1979); Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 782, 788 (10th Cir. 1979); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487,
496 (9th Cir. 1978); Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 1977). The
Johnson criteria have also been used by courts applying other fee shifting statutes. See Com-
ment, supra note, 34 at 345 n.52.
113 S. REP. NO. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5913.
114 Berger, supra note 34, at 286-87; Note, supra note 34, at 372-73.
115 For instance, the "time and labor required" is subsumed in assessing the "novelty and
difficulty" of the question presented. Also, the "attorney's skill" is subsumed in assessing the
attorney's "experience, ability and reputation of counsel."
116 For instance, the "length of relationship between attorney and client" conflicts with
the Act's purpose of assisting those who cannot afford attorneys, those who would not have an
existing relationship with counsel. Also, the "amount of money involved in the case" conflicts
with Congress' directive that fees should be awarded without regard to the pecuniary or non-
pecuniary nature of relief sought. S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 6, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5913.
117 For instance, compare Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1974) with Do-
herty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35, 41 (M.D. Ga. 1973) (both applying criterion number 8,
relief sought; the first case discounted the fee award because of the little public benefit outside
of the class members whereas, in the second case, the court found that consideration irrele-
vant); compare Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976) with Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
718 (5th Cir. 1974) (both applying criterion number 6, contingent nature ofcase; the first case
limited the fee award by the contingent fee contract, and the second case provided for en-
hancement of the fee award because of its contingent nature).
118 See Detroit v. Grinell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[T]his conceptual
amalgam is so extensive and ponderous that it is probably not employed in any precise way
by courts espousing adherence to it."); see also Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165
(3d Cir. 1975).
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dently evaluate their chances of receiving an adequate reward and
are ultimately discouraged from participating in civil rights cases.
Recently, in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 119 the Supreme Court handed
down its first opinion regarding the proper method of calculating fee
awards.' 20 In this case, involuntarily confined patients at a Missouri
state hospital filed a section 1983 action alleging numerous statutory
violations in the conditions at the hospital.' 2' The district court
found constitutional violations in five of six general areas of treat-
ment.1 22 The trial judge awarded $133,332.25 in section 1988 attor-
ney's fees, and included in fee calculations the hours spent by the
plaintiff's attorneys on the unsuccessful claims. 123 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 124
In remanding the case for recomputation of the fees, the
Supreme Court directed the district court to consider the extent of
the plaintiff's success in calculating the proper fee amount. 25 The
Court explained that the district court should initially determine the
fee by multiplying hours reasonably expended by the prevailing
hourly rate. 26 According to the Court, "hours reasonably ex-
pended" are those necessarily spent in achieving the results
obtained. 127
However, in some situations, calculating the hours expended
may be more difficult than in others. The Court noted that where
the plaintiff presents distinct, unrelated claims of civil rights depri-
vation, his attorney's time, if properly recorded, can easily be allo-
119 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
120 The Court has, however, considered the availability of an award in several cases:
Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 416 U.S. 696
(1974); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
121 103 S. Ct. at 1936.
122 Id The district court found that the constitutional rights of involuntarily committed
patients were violated in the following areas: physical environment; individual treatment
plants; least restrictive environment; visitation, telephone, and mail privileges; and seclusion
and restraint. 475 F. Supp. 908, 919-20 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
123 103 S. Ct. at 1937.
124 664 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1981).
125 103 S. Ct. at 1940.
126 Id. at 1937.
127 The Court explained:
Cases may be overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely.
Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a
fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a





cated to the various claims pursued. The district court should then
assess a fee based only on hours spent on the plaintiff's successful
claims. Any time spent on claims that were unsuccessful, however,
should not be compensated, just as they would not be if spent on a
separate, unsuccessful lawsuit. 128 The Court noted that, in other sit-
uations, the plaintiffs claims are not distinct, but rather simply rely
on alternative legal theories or a series of incidents to support a single
claim of civil rights deprivation. The Court said the plaintiff is enti-
tled in such a case to a fee award for all hours expended, if the relief
sought was achieved.' 29
When the district court determines the "hours reasonably ex-
pended," multiplying this number by the "prevailing hourly rate"
yields an initial amount. The district court may then adjust this
amount upward or downward at its discretion. 130 However, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the "results obtained" should be the
primary consideration in making further discretionary adjustments,
although it would permit consideration of the other Johnson
criteria. 131
No fee calculation method will yield complete consistency in de-
termining award amounts, just as the jury system never yields consis-
tent compensatory damage awards to similarly situated plaintiffs.
However, the Supreme Court's fee calculation guidelines will im-
prove the consistency of section 1988 fee awards. By emphasizing the
considerations of "relief obtained" and "hours reasonably ex-
pended," the Court has established a starting point for fee calcula-
128 Again, the Court explained:
In some cases a plaintiff may present in one lawsuit distinctly different claims for
relief that are based on different facts and legal theories. In such a suit,. . . coun-
sel's work on one claim will be unrelated to his work on another claim. Accordingly,
work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit
of the ultimate result achieved.
Id.
129 In other cases the plaintiff's claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or
will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel's time will be devoted gen-
erally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended
on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete
claims. Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief
obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the
litigation.
Id. at 1940-41.
130 The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry.
There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee
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tions. Still, the Hensley decision might be criticized for
overemphasizing the "results obtained" factor in discretionary ad-
justments to the initial fee amount. District courts must therefore
remain mindful of the congressional intent that the amount of the fee
award not be reduced because the relief sought is nonpecuniary.' 3 2
V. Conclusion
This note has presented a summary of the law of fee awards
under the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. The Act's purpose, as
emphasized above, is to encourage private enforcement of civil rights
by aggrieved parties who otherwise could not afford competent coun-
sel. In order for section 1988 to be effective, the courts must consist-
ently and systematically apply its provisions. By enacting the Equal
Access to Justice Act, Congress took a forward step toward consis-
tency by making the United States subject to the provisions of section
1988. Moreover, the courts' consistent and liberal application of the
prevailing party requirement enhances consistency. Finally, the
Supreme Court's Hensley decision should narrow the range of possible
fee awards in a given situation. However, some inconsistencies re-
main. Ad hoc decisions denying fee awards to prevailing parties be-
cause of "special circumstances" inject an unnecessary element of risk
in assessing the chance for a fee award. Similarly, courts awarding
fees at disparate rates unnecessarily confuses the extent to which fees
are available.
As judges continue to apply section 1988, they must consider the
impact of their decisions upon the Act's purpose. Decisions which
restrict the applicability of section 1988 arguably inhibit an untold
number of plaintiffs and counselors from enforcing civil rights laws, a
goal of the utmost priority in our society.
Mark D. Bover"
132 The Senate Report indicates that the type of relief sought by the client should not
impact the court's calculation of a reasonable fee. S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 9, at 6,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5913.
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